Energy Fundamentals - Nuclear and otherwise
Friends at Hanford,
The DOE has been broken since it was created in 1977, which is the major reason that FFTF was lost. The
GNEP is just another bit of nonsense - yes it will provide jobs, but will not resolve technical, political, management and other issues that have plagued nuclear power since its beginning.
Following is my response to a letter to me from The President about long-neglected energy issues. My letter:
1. describes major problems resulting from management by the Department of Energy and its predecessors;
2.. proposes a better, success-based approach based on energy fundamentals and lessons learned from experiences;
3. povides: information about energy fundamentals,
an overview of path of the DOE and its predecessors from success to failure and other problems,
ideas for a better approach, and
other recommendations to resolve America's long-neglected energy issues;
4. expresses the hope to meet and work with The President and other leaders of America to further refine and implement this better approach;
5. includes a copy of my biographical sketch from Who's Who in America, as modified/corrected for the 2008 edition.
6. expresses the hope that it will be possible to meet and work with you and others to resolve America's energy challenges
I would be interested in any comments
Here is my letter:
Clinton Bastin, Chemical Engineer, US Department of Energy (Retired),987 Viscount Court, Avondale Estates, Georgia 30002, Telephone 404 297 2005; E-Mail clintonbastin@bellsouth.net
March 3, 2007
The President, The White House, Washington, DC 20500
Dear Mr. President:
I was pleased to receive your letter and learn of your strong belief that America must address long-neglected energy issues. But there are major problems. The Department of Energy:
Has spent most of a trillion dollars since it was created in 1977 to address energy issues resulting from America’s diminishing supplies of domestic oil and natural gas
Has provided little of value and is unlikely to provide future value
Does not provide full and accurate information to Americans about energy and nuclear technoloy and supports misinformation to obtain funding for programs that are not needed
Does not learn from its own and other’s successes, failures and other problems
Does not integrate research and development through design studies and experience to assure focus on needed improvement
Cancels important programs and rejects proposals based on best technology to obtain funds for development of concepts that are often ill-conceived
Dismissed competent corporations that managed safe and successful programs and relies on government laboratories to manage complex technology
Interacts with its national laboratories in a manner similar to that of the former Soviet Union
Rejects important input based on experience
Supported an activity with potential for an accident much worse than that at Chernobyl
Lost capability to produce tritium needed for nuclear deterrence, plutonium-238 needed to explore space, and isotopes needed for medicine, industry, agriculture and research
Has no plan for responsible disposal of nuclear waste from nuclear power plants
Has no incentives for success and incurs no penalty for failure or misinformation
Works for its own and often against America’s interests.
The adverse impact of government management of complex technology greatly exceeds its wasteful expenditures.
Resolving America’s energy issues and ending the adverse impact from government management of complex technology will require implementation of a better, success-based approach based on full understanding of energy fundamentals and lessons learned from experiences.
This letter will provide information about energy fundamentals, an overview of the path of the DOE and its predecessors from success to failure and other problems, ideas for a better approach and other recommendations to resolve America’s long-neglected energy issues.
ENERGY FUNDAMENTALS
1. Nuclear Energy
Nuclear energy is the ultimate source of all energy. Radiation from decay of nuclear materials in the earth is the energy that keeps earth warm.
Radiation from nuclear fusion reactions at the sun provides energy during the day that partially offsets energy lost from the earth’s surface at night. This energy also purifies and distributes our water and energizes our atmosphere. Energy from within the earth combined with that from the sun makes life here possible.
Radiation is energy. Like other forms of energy, high levels of radiation burn and can be dangerous; low levels warm and are beneficial. High levels of radiation are very effective for destroying cancer. False information about dangers of low levels of radiation is used to justify government funding for work that is not needed. The threshold for danger from radiation is about twenty-five REM (0.25 Sievert); maximum allowable exposures to workers per year is set at one-fifth this amount. A large amount of data indicate a net threshold of beneficial health effects from radiation much larger than the threshold for danger. From personal experience with 65 sieverts of radiation to my face and throat used to destroy a very aggressive cancer, the burn to skin from several sieverts of radiation is comparable to that from about an hour in the summer sun.
The 1979 National Research Council report on energy points out that "the geothermal resource (heat within the earth’s molten core from radioactive decay of nuclear material) represents extremely large amounts of energy . . . but for many reasons direct use of geothermal energy will not be a major contributor to the national energy system until well into the twenty-first century, if ever . . . , (and) cannot be considered among the most important energy alternatives." Present world capability for geothermal production of usable energy is about 8,000 megawatts.
Nuclear materials near the earth’s surface, if used efficiently, are our most abundant energy source to maintain civilization. However, existing nuclear power plants recover less than 1 percent of the energy in uranium and do not use thorium. Efficient use of nuclear resources is essential for disposal of nuclear wastes without need for indefinite safeguards, which cannot be assured.
Nuclear materials have little value except to produce energy and materials for space exploration, medicine, defense and other national needs.
The nuclear fission process provides tens of millions times the energy per unit of mass of life-based fuels and produces tens of millions times less waste. The small amounts of waste from nuclear plants can be safely stored indefinitely and not released to the biosphere.
Because of important design features, US-type nuclear power plants are one of humankind’s safest and most reliable endeavors. They are also highly resistant to terrorist attacks and disruptive weather. Because of the much smaller amounts of fuel needed, nuclear power plants are not vulnerable to transportation disruptions. There has never been a transportation accident where the presence of nuclear materials endangered anyone. Improvements to operations since the accident at Three Mile Island have greatly improved their safety and productivity. A Chernobyl-type accident is not possible in a US type nuclear power plant.
Existing nuclear power plants in the US provide more than 70 percent of the greenhouse gas-free and atmospheric pollution-free generation of electricity. Increased use of nuclear power is the most cost-effective way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to avoid global warming and reduce atmospheric pollutants for better human health.
Nuclear power plants are the foundation for international safeguards, the best assurances of nations that their neighbors are not using nuclear technology to produce nuclear weapons
Reprocessing of used nuclear fuel is essential for full and efficient use of nuclear resources and appropriate disposal of nuclear wastes. DuPont built and operated the only successful reprocessing plants in the US. Its best-in-the-world reprocessing technology features capability for rapid, remote replacement of failed process equipment and piping and rapid restart after shutdown, containment of radioactivity under normal and credible accident conditions, flexibility for changes to accommodate different types of fuels or increases in capacity, safe use of the facility for hundreds of years, efficient recovery and recycle of nuclear materials with very low losses, provision for integration with fuel refabrication capability that would preclude access to or accumulation of separated plutonium or other weapons usable materials, much lower cost for reprocessing than those of others, remote sampling to ensure good material safeguards and other advantages. The time for restart after shutdown for the DuPont designed "F" canyon reprocessing plant at the Savannah River Plant was a few minutes. This contrasts to eight days for restart of Hanford PUREX and thirty days for the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant.
The concept for permanent disposal of nuclear waste in bedrock underlying the SRP proposed by DuPont and endorsed by a committee appointed by former South Carolina Governor John West has formidable, measurable geologic barriers that would ensure indefinite isolation of wastes. The nuclear waste repository at DOE’s Hanford Site in Washington and that planned for Yucca Mountain provide good assurances that humans will never be exposed to dangerous levels of radiation from nuclear waste, but are in the vadose zone and do not have formidable barriers that provide full assurances of indefinite isolation. Disposal of used nuclear fuel would not be a responsible action because it would deny use of an essential and abundant resource and would create geologic deposits of weapons usable materials that would require indefinite safeguards that cannot be assured.
Nuclear fusion reactions that we know of occur at temperatures of many million degrees and generate enormous forces. No materials or forces on earth can contain these reactions in a manner that would permit production of continuous, usable energy. There is no scientific basis for a conclusion that nuclear fusion will ever provide significant amounts of usable energy.
2. Life-Based Materials
Life-based materials are needed for food, transportation, chemicals, clothing, housing and home heating, medicines, and many other commodities essential for civilization. They should be used with full appreciation of their origin, limitations and special needs for their use.
Fossil fuels are materials from past life that were produced and processed by earth’s heat into fuels that we are using hundreds of thousands times faster than they were produced.
Biomass is material from recent life. Production and conversion of biomass into fuels will often require more energy than is obtained from their use. The amount of energy obtainable from biomass will be a very small fraction of that obtained from fossil fuels. Ethanol from all the grain produced in the US would be equivalent to 16% of petroleum fuels used for transportation in the United States.
Coal is America’s most abundant fossil fuel and the only source for large amounts of fluid fuels for future generations.
Natural gas is our most precious and most limited fossil fuel. It is needed to heat homes and produce many essential materials. Its use to generate large amounts of electricity is wasteful.
Oil is our most abundant fluid fuel and is needed for transportation by auto and aircraft.
At present rates of use, natural gas and oil resources would be fully depleted prior to the end of this century. However, long before full depletion, the ability to produce enough to meet demands will be exceeded. The US lost the ability to produce enough oil to meet its demands in 1970; the world is on the verge of losing the ability to meet world demands. Any disruption in supply, such as that following Hurricane Katrina, will result in shortages, long gas lines, increased cost of heating oil and gasoline, increased trade deficits and adverse impact to our economy. Oil from tar sands, oil shale and further exploration could extend the time for full depletion, but limitations on its rate of recovery will limit alleviation from disruptions.
The title of the 1979 report of the extensive study of energy alternatives by the National Research Council, Energy in Transition: 1985 - 2010, reflects what should have been but was not done.
Solar Energy
Energy from the sun is intermittent and reaches earth at relatively low temperature. Based on laws of thermodynamics, conversion of solar energy to another form such as electricity will always be inefficient. Because it is intermittent, the capacity factor (time operating efficiency) will always be low - from 10 to 20%. The environmental cost for construction and maintenance of facilities for solar generation of electricity - plus that for supply of electricity when the sun does not shine - will approach or exceed savings from their operation. Use of batteries to assure continuous availability of electricity will also cost as much as or more - in dollars and adverse environmental impact - than is saved from generation of solar electricity. Government subsidies for solar generation of electricity could lead to facilities that are not cost-effective when the subsidies are removed. Solar generation of electricity and storage of electricity in batteries may be justified in remote locations or in space vehicles not too distant from the sun.
Energy from the sun is abundant and could be increasingly important to heat water for household use and to warm buildings properly designed for such use. However, replacement of existing buildings would not be justified solely by more efficient use of solar warming.
Capacity factors for wind power in some locations will exceed that for solar generation of electricity, but careful evaluation is needed. Government subsidies could lead to facilities that are not cost-effective when the subsidies are removed. Use of batteries to store wind-generated electricity will greatly increase its dollar and environmental cost.
The 1979 report of the major study of energy alternatives by the National Research Council says that "the ecological damage per unit of energy produced is probably greater for hydroelectricity than for any other energy source." . . . ."Among the adverse ecological consequences of new dam construction are the loss of habitat in the immediate area of the reservoir, subtle effects on the biological productivity of the river below the dam, damage to scenic area along the wild stretches of the river, damage to the ecological balance of estuaries due to alteration of freshwater flow patterns, accelerated siltation and eutrophication in the artificial lakes behind dams, adverse effects on fish species that swim up river to spawn, and excess evaporation of water from artificial lakes and the resulting increased salinity, particularly in arid regions."
Hydrogen
Hydrogen is not available in nature as an energy source on earth. Cost for its production - including environmental cost - will exceed savings from its use. Hydrogen is difficult to handle and has a low energy density. Fuel cells are very expensive and not very durable.
OVERVIEW OF A PATH FROM SUCCESS TO FAILURE AND OTHER PROBLEMS
This section describes great successes with use of nuclear technology for the Manhattan Project, successes and failures for the Atomic Energy Commission, and how failure to fully apply lessons learned from these successes and failures led to problems and ultimately to the moratorium on new nuclear power plants. I can provide comparable overviews of other paths to problems, such as loss of ability to produce tritium, plutonium-238 and other important nuclear materials; wasteful expenditures for inappropriate treatment of nuclear wastes; and delays in use of a more energy-efficient process for uranium enrichment.
The Manhattan Project of World War II was a great technological achievement because:
Important discoveries: Albert Einstein’s energy = mass times the speed of light squared, Otto Hahn’s nuclear fission and Glenn Seaborg’s plutonium provided a scientific basis for the effort.
Competent, experienced corporations produced nuclear materials.
DuPont introduced nuclear fission technology and provided corporate management for the Clinton Laboratory and Hanford Engineer Works comparable to that for its commercial plants.
DuPont’s core values of safety, health and the environment, ethics and respect for people have been exceptional constants since the Company was formed in 1802.
Manhattan Project scientists were disappointed with the decision to use corporations to carry out projects and programs. They lacked experience with complex technology, but believed that they could carry out the tasks for the Manhattan Project. (The Soviet Union lacked experienced corporations, and scientists carried out efforts for production of nuclear materials and nuclear weapons. Radiation exposures to workers were among significant differences. Maximum exposure to DuPont workers at Hanford was less than one RAD/year. During the first two years, Average exposure to Soviet workers was more than 100 RAD/year; maximum exposure was more than 300 RAD/year. Some Soviet workers developed illnesses from the high radiation levels. The commercial reprocessing plant built at West Valley, NY, that incorporated laboratory technology, reprocessed 244 tons of power reactor fuel and 375 tons of AEC production reactor fuels during 5-1/2 years of operation. Operation was suspended by order of the AEC Director of Regulation because radiation exposure to workers averaged 50% above allowable amounts and were rising exponentially, and there were other problems. The exposures at West Valley were about thirty times average exposures to workers at the DuPont-operated Savannah River Plant. The decision was made by plant owner Getty Oil not to restart the plant.)
Manhattan Project Director Leslie Groves developed sympathy for the scientists and approved operation of the Clinton Pilot Plant in a production mode, a violation of good management practice. About 300 grams of plutonium were produced and recovered by reprocessing during this 14-month campaign from late 1943 until early 1945, but some at ORNL believed and claimed that "the first kilograms of plutonium were produced in the pilot plant" ( The actual and claimed production are documented in the report The ORNL Chemical Technology Division: 1950-1994 (October 1994), prepared for the DOE by ORNL.) This false claim of high productivity resulted in support by General Groves for National Laboratories so the scientists could carry out the tasks for which they had conducted research and use inappropriate laboratory technology to reprocess highly enriched uranium fuels at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant.
Filters to prevent release of radioactive materials from ICPP operations failed shortly after attempted start of operations and were removed. American Cyanamid Corporation, who had been selected to operate the ICPP, was aware that the plant could not be operated safely or successfully and elected to leave. Phillips Petroleum Company, who was operating the Materials Test Reactor at AEC’s Idaho Site, accepted responsibility for operation of the ICPP, but did not provide corporate management comparable to that provided by DuPont for the Hanford Engineer Works.
General Electric Company replaced DuPont at Hanford, but was not funded to provide corporate management for the effort and serious problems developed. The Hanford PUREX reprocessing plant had to be shut down in 1972 because it - unlike SRP reprocessing plants - could not be operated satisfactorily with a reduced output from Hanford production reactors, nor without release of large quantities of nuclear waste to soils. GE did not learn from these and other AEC experiences and made similar mistakes at its Morris, IL, commercial reprocessing plant.
Former officers of the Army Corps of Engineers recognized the importance of the DuPont effort for the Manhattan Project and urged President Truman to ask DuPont to design, build and operate the Savannah River Plant for the AEC. The SRP was the AEC’s safest and most successful program because DuPont provided core values and management comparable to that for its commercial plants.
Safe and successful use of nuclear power for propulsion of US Navy Ships and Submarines provided full assurances that commercial nuclear power would be safe and successful. But regulators and some nuclear power plant operators did not follow the Nuclear Navy model and did not require full knowledge by operators of the technology and systems for nuclear power plant operation. This became a major problem with larger and more complex nuclear power plants, and ultimately led to the accident at Three Mile Island, long delays in construction and licensing and increased cost of nuclear power plants. This oversight has been eliminated through coordinating efforts of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations and good interactions by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission with nuclear power plant operators, but Americans have not been informed of the improvements.
Nuclear power began in America and other nations with full expectations that reprocessing would be used to permit full and efficient use of nuclear resources and dispose of nuclear wastes without need for indefinite safeguards, which cannot be assured. Successful experiences of DuPont provided full assurances that reprocessing of nuclear power plant fuels would be safe and successful and not result in proliferation or proliferation threats.
Unfortunately, planned use of successful technology for reprocessing of used fuels from nuclear power plants in the US and those in other nations of US origin was cancelled when early nuclear power plant operators accepted gross misinformation in a 1957 AEC report about the success of laboratory reprocessing technology that had failed. (The report overstated productivity of the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant by about a factor of thirty.) Subsequent use and export of the flawed technology resulted in failure of reprocessing in America, proliferation in India, and proliferation threats and problems in other nations. (ORNL/ICPP reprocessing technology was used in India to reprocess natural uranium from the CIRUS (Canada Isotope Reactor United States), a reactor based on Canada’s NRX reactor that was largely paid for by the US to produce plutonium for US nuclear weapons, and provided with heavy water moderator by the US.)
French and Japanese reprocessors requested information about DuPont reprocessing technology but were denied access. British reprocessors had access to DuPont technology, but their focus at the time of access was on their own "no maintenance" approach, which they later determined to be inadequate for commercial fuel reprocessing. Soviet reprocessors used the DuPont "canyon" approach for its plant at Tomsk, but instead of five to six- foot thick heavily reinforced concrete walls at the SRP, used 3-1/2 foot thick brick walls which were inadequate for accident conditions.
Many American corporations, including five large oil companies, made major investments in nuclear fuel cycle technology, but most lost money because they relied on misinformation from the AEC. An important example is the investment of about one-half-billion dollars by Gulf and Shell Oil Companies, owners of General Atomics Corporation (GAC), for an ill-conceived venture to commercialize High Temperature, Gas-cooled Reactors. The GAC concept for HTGRs avoided the inherent disadvantage of graphite moderated reactors, i.e., the very inefficient use of uranium, by use of an enriched uranium - thorium - uranium-233 fuel cycle, which required reprocessing.
GAC relied on the Atomic Energy Commission’s Idaho Office and Idaho Chemical Processing Plant cost estimate for commercial reprocessing that was low by a factor of ten or more, and estimate for cost of a process demonstration that was low by a factor of several hundred. After funding by The Congress for the process demonstration, other formidable problems led to recognition of need for a major task force review which led to much higher and more realistic estimates of cost for demonstration and commercial reprocessing. GAC abandoned the project.
During this same time frame, GAC partnered with Allied Chemical Company as Allied-General Nuclear Services for construction and operation of the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant (BNFP), which was built based on ICPP technology. Annual production reports from Idaho indicated nuclear material recoveries adequate to support an economic venture at Barnwell. Review of accountability records showed that the Idaho reports overstated production by about a factor of five. After learning of this information, AGNS decided not to operate the plant as a commercial venture, and proposed its operation as a government demonstration project. Aware of the flawed technology of the BNFP, AEC officials did not support this proposal.
Inadequate capability of the ICPP resulted in filled used fuel storage basins at reactors throughout the Idaho site, and removal of ICPP ventilation system filters resulted in release of significant amounts of radiation throughout the site. Thus officials and staff at other operations at the Idaho Site recognized that there were formidable problems with reprocessing there and with commercial reprocessing based on the ICPP model. But they did not know about successful reprocessing at the SRP. (After transfer to AEC headquarters in early 1972, I learned that virtually no one there - including AEC attorneys that helped formulate policies - had any understanding of the differences between successful reprocessing technology and the flawed concepts that led to failures, proliferation and other problems.) Scientists and engineers of Argonne National Laboratory at the Idaho Site began development of pyrometallurgical processes that they believed would be better than aqueous processes that are used for reprocessing at the ICPP and worldwide.
Experiments conducted in laboratory-type, manipulator-maintenance hot cells showed that the pyrometallurgical processes (similar to those used for recovery of iron from ore) were much more difficult than aqueous processes, material losses were unacceptably high, and material measurement to assure good accountability for safeguards was virtually impossible.
The experimental programs of ANL were cancelled and used fuels and nuclear materials from the failed program were transferred to the ICPP and the SRP for reprocessing and recovery.
President Richard M. Nixon declared a national commitment to full and efficient use of nuclear materials for energy as a major initiative for energy independence when the US lost the ability during the early 1970s to produce enough oil to meet US demands.
I told AEC officials in late 1972 that proposed commercial nuclear fuel reprocessing plants of General Electric Company (GE) and Allied-General Nuclear Services (AGNS) would not be successful and was asked to chair a task force to review reprocessing history for lessons learned and recommend appropriate action. The task force review focused on:
failure of commercial reprocessing at the plant in West Valley, NY;
likely failures of the GE plant at Morris, IL, and the AGNS plant at Barnwell, SC.;
problems with reprocessing in other nations, most of whom used the ORNL/ICPP concept;
the accident at the British Nuclear Fuels, Ltd., B-204 reprocessing plant at Windscale and deficiencies of the British "no-maintenance" concept;
detonation in May 1974 of a nuclear explosive by India which used plutonium produced and processed in facilities and technology supplied by the US and Canada.
successful reprocessing of DuPont; and
recommendation of the Edison Electric Institute Nuclear Fuel Cycle Committee, Chaired by Duke Power Company President Bill Lee, that used fuel from nuclear power plants be shipped to the SRP for reprocessing by DuPont. (This was the initial plan of the USAEC.)
Major recommendation of the task force was to focus on improvements to successful reprocessing technology, including an assignment to DuPont for lead role for development and design integration.
An AEC General Managers fuel cycle task force endorsed our recommendation and the AEC reassigned responsibilities for nuclear fuel reprocessing and recycle to the AEC Division of Production, an organization that had provided direction for successful reprocessing programs and understood the differences between successful and unsuccessful reprocessing. (Directors of the AEC Division of Production and Managers of the AEC Savannah River Office were former Corps of Engineers officers who understood reasons for success of the Manhattan Project and SRP programs. Responsibilities for commercial fuel reprocessing support had been assigned to the AEC Division of Reactor Development, whose officials and staff did not understand reprocessing.)
I was assigned lead responsibility for the AEC program to support commercial fuel reprocessing and prepared the letter to the Manager of AEC’s Savannah River Office requesting that he ask DuPont to manage this program. The AEC General Manager visited DuPont offices to confirm the assignment.
During this same time period, the AEC started programs to provide full and accurate information to Americans about the importance of nuclear energy, science and technology, and to correct misinformation.
The AEC also started studies of Regional Fuel Cycle Centers (multinational fuel reprocessing and recycle centers) that would provide increased assurances that nations used the nuclear technology and materials for nuclear power and not nuclear weapons. I participated in these studies and proposed that best technology - that of DuPont - be used,. These studies culminated in a proposal by US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to the International Atomic Energy Agency that Regional Fuel Cycle Centers be considered for support of nuclear power.
I participated as a lead consultant in IAEA studies of Regional Fuel Cycle Centres, which concluded with strong support for the concept.
Unfortunately, programs of the AEC were transferred to the Energy Research and Development Administration in January 1975. One of the first actions of ERDA, carried out at the direction of the Office of General Counsel, was to cancel programs to provide full and accurate information to Americans about nuclear technology.
Leaders of nuclear programs in ERDA did not understand the complexities and demands of safe, successful fuel reprocessing and recycle, set aside those who did, and transferred program responsibilities back to the Office of Nuclear Energy, successor to the AEC Division of Reactor Development.
Presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter carried out major policy reviews of reprocessing with no input from persons who understood the technology and what had happened that led to failure, proliferation and other problems. The indefinite deferral of efficient use of nuclear energy resources and responsible disposal of nuclear wastes resulting from these reviews were major factors in the moratorium on new nuclear power plants that started in 1974.
The Ford White House abandoned support for Multinational (Regional) Nuclear Fuel Recycle Centers at about the same time that the International Atomic Energy Agency endorsed the concept.
In 1978, DuPont completed Design Integration Studies and prepared conceptual designs and cost estimates for a Spent LWR Fuel Recycle Complex that would have resolved concerns and permitted reprocessing at less that one-third present costs. There would have been no access to or accumulation of separated plutonium. This complex would have been excellent for a regional fuel cycle center, or for nations with large nuclear power programs.
Leaders of the DOE set aside information from DuPont about reprocessing plant designs that would have avoided problems and supported use and development of laboratory concepts that had no potential for success. No information about the success-based concepts were provided to Presidents Carter or Reagan.
The DOE carried out research and development at Oak Ridge National Laboratory for use of Argonne National Laboratory research-type maintenance systems for conventional solvent extraction processes and supported use of the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant for demonstration reprocessing - despite the facts that its technology was flawed and there was potential for an accident with release of radioactivity much worse than that at Chernobyl. Fortunately, President Reagan rejected the proposal.
Design studies by Bechtel indicated that the ORNL concept for laboratory type maintenance for conventional reprocessing technology would be much more expensive than that for successful reprocessing, and government funding was discontinued. However, the program was continued as collaborative development with Japan, and some provisions of the concept were apparently incorporated in the very expensive, French-designed reprocessing plant at Rokkasho Mura.
The DOE cancelled collaborative development with Japan and shut down the Fast Flux Test Facility at Hanford in order to support a demonstration by Argonne National Laboratory of another pyrometallurgical concept - electrorefining - for reprocessing of used nuclear fuel. The electrorefining process had been developed by Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory for recovery of very pure plutonium from scrap generated during fabrication of plutonium weapons parts.
In 1991 I was assigned by DOE’s Office of Nuclear Energy to evaluate this process for a planned demonstration, and identified major concerns about operability, maintainability, safeguardability, and containment of radioactivity - major problems with commercial reprocessing. Of greatest concern were great difficulties for material balance measurements and high plutonium losses. These findings led to a conclusion that the safeguards challenge would be difficult and the process as planned would be neither proliferation-resistant nor viable for commercial nuclear fuel recycle. Concerns about the planned demonstration were reviewed with DOE and DOE laboratory management and technical staff, ANL/DOE Peer Review Groups and many others, and there was no significant disagreement with my findings.
The DOE Strategic Plan for a Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) states "For the past 30 years the United States has conducted research to develop advanced methods of reprocessing spent commercial nuclear fuel that might make reprocessing easier to safeguard and more proliferation-resistant." This statement is misleading and could lead to further misdirection and wasteful expenditures.
Several U.S. nuclear power plant operators are supporting reprocessing with French technology that incorporates experience but lacks important features of DuPont technology.
A BETTER APPROACH TO RESOLVE AMERICA’S ENERGY CHALLENGES
A better approach to resolve America’s long neglected energy challenges should include:
1. The U.S. Energy and Nuclear Technology Board that would have ex_officio members and those appointed by you and future Presidents with the advice and consent of The Senate that would meet periodically to recommend long_term energy and nuclear technology plans, policies, and strategies for America
2. Competent corporate instead of government management of energy and nuclear technology
3. Full and efficient use of nuclear materials instead of their disposal
4. Full and accurate information to Americans about nuclear technology and limitations, challenges and/or non_viability of alternative energy sources
5. Revitalization of President Eisenhower's vision of Atoms for Peace, with cooperation among nations for full use of well_safeguarded, well_managed, and well_conceived nuclear technology for peaceful purposes
6. Partnership_type actions between workers and managers to resolve concerns about nuclear safety and nuclear materials safeguards, and between regulators and those regulated to ensure the best safety, productivity, and cost_effectiveness of nuclear power plants and other licensed nuclear facilities.
7. A "Partnership for America" to develop and implement these ideas to resolve long_neglected energy and nuclear technology challenges and avoid adverse consequences inherent in government management of complex technology.
SOME FINAL THOUGHTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: ENERGY IMPERATIVES
1. Nuclear programs managed by DuPont for the Manhattan Project and Atomic Energy Commission were among the greatest technological achievements of all time. If DuPont concepts had been used for reprocessing and recycle of nuclear materials in used nuclear power plant fuels and disposal of nuclear wastes, many formidable problems and wasteful expenditures would have been avoided.
You, with support from The Congress, and the nuclear power industry should ask DuPont to manage programs for reprocessing and recycle of nuclear materials in used nuclear fuel and disposal of nuclear wastes. Funds for this should be provided by the nuclear waste fund, as appropriate. Leaders of State Governments should be asked to appoint technical/political committees to review DuPont concepts and studies for waste disposal, as Governor John West of South Carolina did for DuPont studies for disposal in bedrock.
2. At a time of need for a major transition, i.e., the need to end our dangerous addiction to imported oil, good government leadership and direction is essential. This leadership and direction should be based on lessons learned from experiences and good understanding of energy fundamentals.
3. Nations that have reduced dependence on imported oil have done so through higher taxes.
4. The need for electric-powered, high speed rail for both inter and intra-regional travel was recognized at the beginning of America’s energy crisis. This need is greater today.
5. Use of fossil and other life-based materials for energy produces atmospheric pollution and greenhouse gases. These materials are needed for transportation in autos and aircraft, household heating and many other important uses. Their use to generate electricity should be phased out.
6. Careful attention should be given to energy fundamentals to avoid subsidies for energy alternatives that will become obsolete when subsidies are removed, and to eliminate funding for non-viable energy systems . The section of "Energy Fundamentals" in this letter should be further refined by The U.S. Energy and Nuclear Technology Board and information provided to all Americans.
Mr. President, the transition from a failure-based to a success-based approach for resolution of America’s long-neglected energy issues will be very difficult. I would be pleased to meet and work with you and other leaders of America to help further refine and implement this better approach that is needed. A copy of my biographical sketch is enclosed.
Best wishes!
Sincerely
Clinton Bastin
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH FOR CLINTON BASTIN FROM 2007 EDITION OF WHO’S WHO IN AMERICA, AS MODIFIED FOR 2008 EDITION
BASTIN, CLINTON, retired chemical engineer, retired federal executive for national nuclear programs and initiatives, life mission to resolve US energy challenges; b. Lancaster, Ky., June 4, 1927; s. Clinton Bowen and Adelaide Klingman Bastin; m. Barbara Spencer Bastin; children: Clinton Bowen III, Nancy Bastin Perry, Anna Bastin McKee, Herbert Spencer. B of Chem. Engring., Ga. Inst. of Tech., 1950; reprocessing and nuclear waste summer seminar for chem. engring. faculty, Amer. Inst. Engring. Edu., Hanford, WA, 1958. Fire protection engr. Southeastern Underwriters Assn., Atlanta, 1950––55; USAEC mgr. heavy water prodn. and distb (first US Atoms for Peace), quality assurance for tritium wpns. components, plutonium_238 prodn and proc.(nuclear power for space), used nuc power fuel disp., Sav Riv Plant, Aiken, SC, 1955––62; mgr. nuc. fuel reprocessing, nuclear waste, related programs and tritium prodn, proc and use in weapons, mem. AEC steering com. gas centrifuge devel., SRP, 1962––72, leader to resolve fuel reprocessing problems Washington, 1972––74; chief light water fuel reprocessing br. US ERDA, Washington, 1975––76, lead tech. cons. Internat. Atomic Energy Agency study of regional fuel reprocessing, 1976; tech. leader, US nonproliferation initiative with India, US NSC Task Force, US Dept. State, Washington, 1977––79; mgr. fuel reprocessing devel., USDOE, 1980__81; coord. with Japan for nuc. fuel cycle devel., 1982––93; pres. DOE hdqs. employees union Nat. Treasury Employees Union, Washington, 1983––96; cons. on nuc. proliferation threats US Nat. Security Agys., Aiken, SC and Washington, 1966__96; ret., 1997; V.P. World Coun. of Nuc. Workers, Paris, 2000––; spkr. in field; cons. in field. Author: (worldwide nuc. programs) US Nuclear Technology: Need for a New Approach, 1996, US Nuclear Technology: Need For New Vision, 1999. Pres. Kiwanis Club of Northlake Golden K, Decatur, Ga., 2004––. Chemistry Instructor (PFC) 1945__46, Marine Corps Institute, Washington, DC. Recipient "Thanks for Wonderful Partnership," Energy Sec. Hazel O'Leary, 1997, Distinguished Career Svc. award, Recognition as US authority on Nuc. Fuel Reprocessing, 1997, letter from Ga Tech Pres. G. Wayne Clough that work on energy is important to future of America, 2004. Mem.: Am. Nuc. Soc. (chair, Ga. sect. 2005––07). Achievements include: (1) selected centrifugal contactors for demonstration which resulted in major reprocessing improvement, 1966, (2) AEC accepted recom. for reproc. based on success instead of failure, 1974, which would have resolved concerns, 1978); (3) Chmn of India AEC accepted recom. that prov. basis for continued nuclear cooperation with US, 1978; (4) Ministry for Atomic Energy of Russia and Russian Nuclear Workers Union adopted ideas for partnerships for improved safety of nuclear facilities and safeguards of nuclear materials (1997); (5), provided info. on (3) to Pres. Bill Clinton and India’s Ambassador to US that he sent to his govt that provided a basis for nuclear cooperation between India and US (1998); Avocations: walking, gardening, writing, teaching nuclear energy at Emory Univ. Lifelong Learning Center. Home: 987 Viscount Ct Avondale Estates GA 30002 Office Phone: 404_297_2005. Personal E_mail: clintonbastin@bellsouth.net.
The DOE has been broken since it was created in 1977, which is the major reason that FFTF was lost. The
GNEP is just another bit of nonsense - yes it will provide jobs, but will not resolve technical, political, management and other issues that have plagued nuclear power since its beginning.
Following is my response to a letter to me from The President about long-neglected energy issues. My letter:
1. describes major problems resulting from management by the Department of Energy and its predecessors;
2.. proposes a better, success-based approach based on energy fundamentals and lessons learned from experiences;
3. povides: information about energy fundamentals,
an overview of path of the DOE and its predecessors from success to failure and other problems,
ideas for a better approach, and
other recommendations to resolve America's long-neglected energy issues;
4. expresses the hope to meet and work with The President and other leaders of America to further refine and implement this better approach;
5. includes a copy of my biographical sketch from Who's Who in America, as modified/corrected for the 2008 edition.
6. expresses the hope that it will be possible to meet and work with you and others to resolve America's energy challenges
I would be interested in any comments
Here is my letter:
Clinton Bastin, Chemical Engineer, US Department of Energy (Retired),987 Viscount Court, Avondale Estates, Georgia 30002, Telephone 404 297 2005; E-Mail clintonbastin@bellsouth.net
March 3, 2007
The President, The White House, Washington, DC 20500
Dear Mr. President:
I was pleased to receive your letter and learn of your strong belief that America must address long-neglected energy issues. But there are major problems. The Department of Energy:
Has spent most of a trillion dollars since it was created in 1977 to address energy issues resulting from America’s diminishing supplies of domestic oil and natural gas
Has provided little of value and is unlikely to provide future value
Does not provide full and accurate information to Americans about energy and nuclear technoloy and supports misinformation to obtain funding for programs that are not needed
Does not learn from its own and other’s successes, failures and other problems
Does not integrate research and development through design studies and experience to assure focus on needed improvement
Cancels important programs and rejects proposals based on best technology to obtain funds for development of concepts that are often ill-conceived
Dismissed competent corporations that managed safe and successful programs and relies on government laboratories to manage complex technology
Interacts with its national laboratories in a manner similar to that of the former Soviet Union
Rejects important input based on experience
Supported an activity with potential for an accident much worse than that at Chernobyl
Lost capability to produce tritium needed for nuclear deterrence, plutonium-238 needed to explore space, and isotopes needed for medicine, industry, agriculture and research
Has no plan for responsible disposal of nuclear waste from nuclear power plants
Has no incentives for success and incurs no penalty for failure or misinformation
Works for its own and often against America’s interests.
The adverse impact of government management of complex technology greatly exceeds its wasteful expenditures.
Resolving America’s energy issues and ending the adverse impact from government management of complex technology will require implementation of a better, success-based approach based on full understanding of energy fundamentals and lessons learned from experiences.
This letter will provide information about energy fundamentals, an overview of the path of the DOE and its predecessors from success to failure and other problems, ideas for a better approach and other recommendations to resolve America’s long-neglected energy issues.
ENERGY FUNDAMENTALS
1. Nuclear Energy
Nuclear energy is the ultimate source of all energy. Radiation from decay of nuclear materials in the earth is the energy that keeps earth warm.
Radiation from nuclear fusion reactions at the sun provides energy during the day that partially offsets energy lost from the earth’s surface at night. This energy also purifies and distributes our water and energizes our atmosphere. Energy from within the earth combined with that from the sun makes life here possible.
Radiation is energy. Like other forms of energy, high levels of radiation burn and can be dangerous; low levels warm and are beneficial. High levels of radiation are very effective for destroying cancer. False information about dangers of low levels of radiation is used to justify government funding for work that is not needed. The threshold for danger from radiation is about twenty-five REM (0.25 Sievert); maximum allowable exposures to workers per year is set at one-fifth this amount. A large amount of data indicate a net threshold of beneficial health effects from radiation much larger than the threshold for danger. From personal experience with 65 sieverts of radiation to my face and throat used to destroy a very aggressive cancer, the burn to skin from several sieverts of radiation is comparable to that from about an hour in the summer sun.
The 1979 National Research Council report on energy points out that "the geothermal resource (heat within the earth’s molten core from radioactive decay of nuclear material) represents extremely large amounts of energy . . . but for many reasons direct use of geothermal energy will not be a major contributor to the national energy system until well into the twenty-first century, if ever . . . , (and) cannot be considered among the most important energy alternatives." Present world capability for geothermal production of usable energy is about 8,000 megawatts.
Nuclear materials near the earth’s surface, if used efficiently, are our most abundant energy source to maintain civilization. However, existing nuclear power plants recover less than 1 percent of the energy in uranium and do not use thorium. Efficient use of nuclear resources is essential for disposal of nuclear wastes without need for indefinite safeguards, which cannot be assured.
Nuclear materials have little value except to produce energy and materials for space exploration, medicine, defense and other national needs.
The nuclear fission process provides tens of millions times the energy per unit of mass of life-based fuels and produces tens of millions times less waste. The small amounts of waste from nuclear plants can be safely stored indefinitely and not released to the biosphere.
Because of important design features, US-type nuclear power plants are one of humankind’s safest and most reliable endeavors. They are also highly resistant to terrorist attacks and disruptive weather. Because of the much smaller amounts of fuel needed, nuclear power plants are not vulnerable to transportation disruptions. There has never been a transportation accident where the presence of nuclear materials endangered anyone. Improvements to operations since the accident at Three Mile Island have greatly improved their safety and productivity. A Chernobyl-type accident is not possible in a US type nuclear power plant.
Existing nuclear power plants in the US provide more than 70 percent of the greenhouse gas-free and atmospheric pollution-free generation of electricity. Increased use of nuclear power is the most cost-effective way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to avoid global warming and reduce atmospheric pollutants for better human health.
Nuclear power plants are the foundation for international safeguards, the best assurances of nations that their neighbors are not using nuclear technology to produce nuclear weapons
Reprocessing of used nuclear fuel is essential for full and efficient use of nuclear resources and appropriate disposal of nuclear wastes. DuPont built and operated the only successful reprocessing plants in the US. Its best-in-the-world reprocessing technology features capability for rapid, remote replacement of failed process equipment and piping and rapid restart after shutdown, containment of radioactivity under normal and credible accident conditions, flexibility for changes to accommodate different types of fuels or increases in capacity, safe use of the facility for hundreds of years, efficient recovery and recycle of nuclear materials with very low losses, provision for integration with fuel refabrication capability that would preclude access to or accumulation of separated plutonium or other weapons usable materials, much lower cost for reprocessing than those of others, remote sampling to ensure good material safeguards and other advantages. The time for restart after shutdown for the DuPont designed "F" canyon reprocessing plant at the Savannah River Plant was a few minutes. This contrasts to eight days for restart of Hanford PUREX and thirty days for the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant.
The concept for permanent disposal of nuclear waste in bedrock underlying the SRP proposed by DuPont and endorsed by a committee appointed by former South Carolina Governor John West has formidable, measurable geologic barriers that would ensure indefinite isolation of wastes. The nuclear waste repository at DOE’s Hanford Site in Washington and that planned for Yucca Mountain provide good assurances that humans will never be exposed to dangerous levels of radiation from nuclear waste, but are in the vadose zone and do not have formidable barriers that provide full assurances of indefinite isolation. Disposal of used nuclear fuel would not be a responsible action because it would deny use of an essential and abundant resource and would create geologic deposits of weapons usable materials that would require indefinite safeguards that cannot be assured.
Nuclear fusion reactions that we know of occur at temperatures of many million degrees and generate enormous forces. No materials or forces on earth can contain these reactions in a manner that would permit production of continuous, usable energy. There is no scientific basis for a conclusion that nuclear fusion will ever provide significant amounts of usable energy.
2. Life-Based Materials
Life-based materials are needed for food, transportation, chemicals, clothing, housing and home heating, medicines, and many other commodities essential for civilization. They should be used with full appreciation of their origin, limitations and special needs for their use.
Fossil fuels are materials from past life that were produced and processed by earth’s heat into fuels that we are using hundreds of thousands times faster than they were produced.
Biomass is material from recent life. Production and conversion of biomass into fuels will often require more energy than is obtained from their use. The amount of energy obtainable from biomass will be a very small fraction of that obtained from fossil fuels. Ethanol from all the grain produced in the US would be equivalent to 16% of petroleum fuels used for transportation in the United States.
Coal is America’s most abundant fossil fuel and the only source for large amounts of fluid fuels for future generations.
Natural gas is our most precious and most limited fossil fuel. It is needed to heat homes and produce many essential materials. Its use to generate large amounts of electricity is wasteful.
Oil is our most abundant fluid fuel and is needed for transportation by auto and aircraft.
At present rates of use, natural gas and oil resources would be fully depleted prior to the end of this century. However, long before full depletion, the ability to produce enough to meet demands will be exceeded. The US lost the ability to produce enough oil to meet its demands in 1970; the world is on the verge of losing the ability to meet world demands. Any disruption in supply, such as that following Hurricane Katrina, will result in shortages, long gas lines, increased cost of heating oil and gasoline, increased trade deficits and adverse impact to our economy. Oil from tar sands, oil shale and further exploration could extend the time for full depletion, but limitations on its rate of recovery will limit alleviation from disruptions.
The title of the 1979 report of the extensive study of energy alternatives by the National Research Council, Energy in Transition: 1985 - 2010, reflects what should have been but was not done.
Solar Energy
Energy from the sun is intermittent and reaches earth at relatively low temperature. Based on laws of thermodynamics, conversion of solar energy to another form such as electricity will always be inefficient. Because it is intermittent, the capacity factor (time operating efficiency) will always be low - from 10 to 20%. The environmental cost for construction and maintenance of facilities for solar generation of electricity - plus that for supply of electricity when the sun does not shine - will approach or exceed savings from their operation. Use of batteries to assure continuous availability of electricity will also cost as much as or more - in dollars and adverse environmental impact - than is saved from generation of solar electricity. Government subsidies for solar generation of electricity could lead to facilities that are not cost-effective when the subsidies are removed. Solar generation of electricity and storage of electricity in batteries may be justified in remote locations or in space vehicles not too distant from the sun.
Energy from the sun is abundant and could be increasingly important to heat water for household use and to warm buildings properly designed for such use. However, replacement of existing buildings would not be justified solely by more efficient use of solar warming.
Capacity factors for wind power in some locations will exceed that for solar generation of electricity, but careful evaluation is needed. Government subsidies could lead to facilities that are not cost-effective when the subsidies are removed. Use of batteries to store wind-generated electricity will greatly increase its dollar and environmental cost.
The 1979 report of the major study of energy alternatives by the National Research Council says that "the ecological damage per unit of energy produced is probably greater for hydroelectricity than for any other energy source." . . . ."Among the adverse ecological consequences of new dam construction are the loss of habitat in the immediate area of the reservoir, subtle effects on the biological productivity of the river below the dam, damage to scenic area along the wild stretches of the river, damage to the ecological balance of estuaries due to alteration of freshwater flow patterns, accelerated siltation and eutrophication in the artificial lakes behind dams, adverse effects on fish species that swim up river to spawn, and excess evaporation of water from artificial lakes and the resulting increased salinity, particularly in arid regions."
Hydrogen
Hydrogen is not available in nature as an energy source on earth. Cost for its production - including environmental cost - will exceed savings from its use. Hydrogen is difficult to handle and has a low energy density. Fuel cells are very expensive and not very durable.
OVERVIEW OF A PATH FROM SUCCESS TO FAILURE AND OTHER PROBLEMS
This section describes great successes with use of nuclear technology for the Manhattan Project, successes and failures for the Atomic Energy Commission, and how failure to fully apply lessons learned from these successes and failures led to problems and ultimately to the moratorium on new nuclear power plants. I can provide comparable overviews of other paths to problems, such as loss of ability to produce tritium, plutonium-238 and other important nuclear materials; wasteful expenditures for inappropriate treatment of nuclear wastes; and delays in use of a more energy-efficient process for uranium enrichment.
The Manhattan Project of World War II was a great technological achievement because:
Important discoveries: Albert Einstein’s energy = mass times the speed of light squared, Otto Hahn’s nuclear fission and Glenn Seaborg’s plutonium provided a scientific basis for the effort.
Competent, experienced corporations produced nuclear materials.
DuPont introduced nuclear fission technology and provided corporate management for the Clinton Laboratory and Hanford Engineer Works comparable to that for its commercial plants.
DuPont’s core values of safety, health and the environment, ethics and respect for people have been exceptional constants since the Company was formed in 1802.
Manhattan Project scientists were disappointed with the decision to use corporations to carry out projects and programs. They lacked experience with complex technology, but believed that they could carry out the tasks for the Manhattan Project. (The Soviet Union lacked experienced corporations, and scientists carried out efforts for production of nuclear materials and nuclear weapons. Radiation exposures to workers were among significant differences. Maximum exposure to DuPont workers at Hanford was less than one RAD/year. During the first two years, Average exposure to Soviet workers was more than 100 RAD/year; maximum exposure was more than 300 RAD/year. Some Soviet workers developed illnesses from the high radiation levels. The commercial reprocessing plant built at West Valley, NY, that incorporated laboratory technology, reprocessed 244 tons of power reactor fuel and 375 tons of AEC production reactor fuels during 5-1/2 years of operation. Operation was suspended by order of the AEC Director of Regulation because radiation exposure to workers averaged 50% above allowable amounts and were rising exponentially, and there were other problems. The exposures at West Valley were about thirty times average exposures to workers at the DuPont-operated Savannah River Plant. The decision was made by plant owner Getty Oil not to restart the plant.)
Manhattan Project Director Leslie Groves developed sympathy for the scientists and approved operation of the Clinton Pilot Plant in a production mode, a violation of good management practice. About 300 grams of plutonium were produced and recovered by reprocessing during this 14-month campaign from late 1943 until early 1945, but some at ORNL believed and claimed that "the first kilograms of plutonium were produced in the pilot plant" ( The actual and claimed production are documented in the report The ORNL Chemical Technology Division: 1950-1994 (October 1994), prepared for the DOE by ORNL.) This false claim of high productivity resulted in support by General Groves for National Laboratories so the scientists could carry out the tasks for which they had conducted research and use inappropriate laboratory technology to reprocess highly enriched uranium fuels at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant.
Filters to prevent release of radioactive materials from ICPP operations failed shortly after attempted start of operations and were removed. American Cyanamid Corporation, who had been selected to operate the ICPP, was aware that the plant could not be operated safely or successfully and elected to leave. Phillips Petroleum Company, who was operating the Materials Test Reactor at AEC’s Idaho Site, accepted responsibility for operation of the ICPP, but did not provide corporate management comparable to that provided by DuPont for the Hanford Engineer Works.
General Electric Company replaced DuPont at Hanford, but was not funded to provide corporate management for the effort and serious problems developed. The Hanford PUREX reprocessing plant had to be shut down in 1972 because it - unlike SRP reprocessing plants - could not be operated satisfactorily with a reduced output from Hanford production reactors, nor without release of large quantities of nuclear waste to soils. GE did not learn from these and other AEC experiences and made similar mistakes at its Morris, IL, commercial reprocessing plant.
Former officers of the Army Corps of Engineers recognized the importance of the DuPont effort for the Manhattan Project and urged President Truman to ask DuPont to design, build and operate the Savannah River Plant for the AEC. The SRP was the AEC’s safest and most successful program because DuPont provided core values and management comparable to that for its commercial plants.
Safe and successful use of nuclear power for propulsion of US Navy Ships and Submarines provided full assurances that commercial nuclear power would be safe and successful. But regulators and some nuclear power plant operators did not follow the Nuclear Navy model and did not require full knowledge by operators of the technology and systems for nuclear power plant operation. This became a major problem with larger and more complex nuclear power plants, and ultimately led to the accident at Three Mile Island, long delays in construction and licensing and increased cost of nuclear power plants. This oversight has been eliminated through coordinating efforts of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations and good interactions by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission with nuclear power plant operators, but Americans have not been informed of the improvements.
Nuclear power began in America and other nations with full expectations that reprocessing would be used to permit full and efficient use of nuclear resources and dispose of nuclear wastes without need for indefinite safeguards, which cannot be assured. Successful experiences of DuPont provided full assurances that reprocessing of nuclear power plant fuels would be safe and successful and not result in proliferation or proliferation threats.
Unfortunately, planned use of successful technology for reprocessing of used fuels from nuclear power plants in the US and those in other nations of US origin was cancelled when early nuclear power plant operators accepted gross misinformation in a 1957 AEC report about the success of laboratory reprocessing technology that had failed. (The report overstated productivity of the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant by about a factor of thirty.) Subsequent use and export of the flawed technology resulted in failure of reprocessing in America, proliferation in India, and proliferation threats and problems in other nations. (ORNL/ICPP reprocessing technology was used in India to reprocess natural uranium from the CIRUS (Canada Isotope Reactor United States), a reactor based on Canada’s NRX reactor that was largely paid for by the US to produce plutonium for US nuclear weapons, and provided with heavy water moderator by the US.)
French and Japanese reprocessors requested information about DuPont reprocessing technology but were denied access. British reprocessors had access to DuPont technology, but their focus at the time of access was on their own "no maintenance" approach, which they later determined to be inadequate for commercial fuel reprocessing. Soviet reprocessors used the DuPont "canyon" approach for its plant at Tomsk, but instead of five to six- foot thick heavily reinforced concrete walls at the SRP, used 3-1/2 foot thick brick walls which were inadequate for accident conditions.
Many American corporations, including five large oil companies, made major investments in nuclear fuel cycle technology, but most lost money because they relied on misinformation from the AEC. An important example is the investment of about one-half-billion dollars by Gulf and Shell Oil Companies, owners of General Atomics Corporation (GAC), for an ill-conceived venture to commercialize High Temperature, Gas-cooled Reactors. The GAC concept for HTGRs avoided the inherent disadvantage of graphite moderated reactors, i.e., the very inefficient use of uranium, by use of an enriched uranium - thorium - uranium-233 fuel cycle, which required reprocessing.
GAC relied on the Atomic Energy Commission’s Idaho Office and Idaho Chemical Processing Plant cost estimate for commercial reprocessing that was low by a factor of ten or more, and estimate for cost of a process demonstration that was low by a factor of several hundred. After funding by The Congress for the process demonstration, other formidable problems led to recognition of need for a major task force review which led to much higher and more realistic estimates of cost for demonstration and commercial reprocessing. GAC abandoned the project.
During this same time frame, GAC partnered with Allied Chemical Company as Allied-General Nuclear Services for construction and operation of the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant (BNFP), which was built based on ICPP technology. Annual production reports from Idaho indicated nuclear material recoveries adequate to support an economic venture at Barnwell. Review of accountability records showed that the Idaho reports overstated production by about a factor of five. After learning of this information, AGNS decided not to operate the plant as a commercial venture, and proposed its operation as a government demonstration project. Aware of the flawed technology of the BNFP, AEC officials did not support this proposal.
Inadequate capability of the ICPP resulted in filled used fuel storage basins at reactors throughout the Idaho site, and removal of ICPP ventilation system filters resulted in release of significant amounts of radiation throughout the site. Thus officials and staff at other operations at the Idaho Site recognized that there were formidable problems with reprocessing there and with commercial reprocessing based on the ICPP model. But they did not know about successful reprocessing at the SRP. (After transfer to AEC headquarters in early 1972, I learned that virtually no one there - including AEC attorneys that helped formulate policies - had any understanding of the differences between successful reprocessing technology and the flawed concepts that led to failures, proliferation and other problems.) Scientists and engineers of Argonne National Laboratory at the Idaho Site began development of pyrometallurgical processes that they believed would be better than aqueous processes that are used for reprocessing at the ICPP and worldwide.
Experiments conducted in laboratory-type, manipulator-maintenance hot cells showed that the pyrometallurgical processes (similar to those used for recovery of iron from ore) were much more difficult than aqueous processes, material losses were unacceptably high, and material measurement to assure good accountability for safeguards was virtually impossible.
The experimental programs of ANL were cancelled and used fuels and nuclear materials from the failed program were transferred to the ICPP and the SRP for reprocessing and recovery.
President Richard M. Nixon declared a national commitment to full and efficient use of nuclear materials for energy as a major initiative for energy independence when the US lost the ability during the early 1970s to produce enough oil to meet US demands.
I told AEC officials in late 1972 that proposed commercial nuclear fuel reprocessing plants of General Electric Company (GE) and Allied-General Nuclear Services (AGNS) would not be successful and was asked to chair a task force to review reprocessing history for lessons learned and recommend appropriate action. The task force review focused on:
failure of commercial reprocessing at the plant in West Valley, NY;
likely failures of the GE plant at Morris, IL, and the AGNS plant at Barnwell, SC.;
problems with reprocessing in other nations, most of whom used the ORNL/ICPP concept;
the accident at the British Nuclear Fuels, Ltd., B-204 reprocessing plant at Windscale and deficiencies of the British "no-maintenance" concept;
detonation in May 1974 of a nuclear explosive by India which used plutonium produced and processed in facilities and technology supplied by the US and Canada.
successful reprocessing of DuPont; and
recommendation of the Edison Electric Institute Nuclear Fuel Cycle Committee, Chaired by Duke Power Company President Bill Lee, that used fuel from nuclear power plants be shipped to the SRP for reprocessing by DuPont. (This was the initial plan of the USAEC.)
Major recommendation of the task force was to focus on improvements to successful reprocessing technology, including an assignment to DuPont for lead role for development and design integration.
An AEC General Managers fuel cycle task force endorsed our recommendation and the AEC reassigned responsibilities for nuclear fuel reprocessing and recycle to the AEC Division of Production, an organization that had provided direction for successful reprocessing programs and understood the differences between successful and unsuccessful reprocessing. (Directors of the AEC Division of Production and Managers of the AEC Savannah River Office were former Corps of Engineers officers who understood reasons for success of the Manhattan Project and SRP programs. Responsibilities for commercial fuel reprocessing support had been assigned to the AEC Division of Reactor Development, whose officials and staff did not understand reprocessing.)
I was assigned lead responsibility for the AEC program to support commercial fuel reprocessing and prepared the letter to the Manager of AEC’s Savannah River Office requesting that he ask DuPont to manage this program. The AEC General Manager visited DuPont offices to confirm the assignment.
During this same time period, the AEC started programs to provide full and accurate information to Americans about the importance of nuclear energy, science and technology, and to correct misinformation.
The AEC also started studies of Regional Fuel Cycle Centers (multinational fuel reprocessing and recycle centers) that would provide increased assurances that nations used the nuclear technology and materials for nuclear power and not nuclear weapons. I participated in these studies and proposed that best technology - that of DuPont - be used,. These studies culminated in a proposal by US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to the International Atomic Energy Agency that Regional Fuel Cycle Centers be considered for support of nuclear power.
I participated as a lead consultant in IAEA studies of Regional Fuel Cycle Centres, which concluded with strong support for the concept.
Unfortunately, programs of the AEC were transferred to the Energy Research and Development Administration in January 1975. One of the first actions of ERDA, carried out at the direction of the Office of General Counsel, was to cancel programs to provide full and accurate information to Americans about nuclear technology.
Leaders of nuclear programs in ERDA did not understand the complexities and demands of safe, successful fuel reprocessing and recycle, set aside those who did, and transferred program responsibilities back to the Office of Nuclear Energy, successor to the AEC Division of Reactor Development.
Presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter carried out major policy reviews of reprocessing with no input from persons who understood the technology and what had happened that led to failure, proliferation and other problems. The indefinite deferral of efficient use of nuclear energy resources and responsible disposal of nuclear wastes resulting from these reviews were major factors in the moratorium on new nuclear power plants that started in 1974.
The Ford White House abandoned support for Multinational (Regional) Nuclear Fuel Recycle Centers at about the same time that the International Atomic Energy Agency endorsed the concept.
In 1978, DuPont completed Design Integration Studies and prepared conceptual designs and cost estimates for a Spent LWR Fuel Recycle Complex that would have resolved concerns and permitted reprocessing at less that one-third present costs. There would have been no access to or accumulation of separated plutonium. This complex would have been excellent for a regional fuel cycle center, or for nations with large nuclear power programs.
Leaders of the DOE set aside information from DuPont about reprocessing plant designs that would have avoided problems and supported use and development of laboratory concepts that had no potential for success. No information about the success-based concepts were provided to Presidents Carter or Reagan.
The DOE carried out research and development at Oak Ridge National Laboratory for use of Argonne National Laboratory research-type maintenance systems for conventional solvent extraction processes and supported use of the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant for demonstration reprocessing - despite the facts that its technology was flawed and there was potential for an accident with release of radioactivity much worse than that at Chernobyl. Fortunately, President Reagan rejected the proposal.
Design studies by Bechtel indicated that the ORNL concept for laboratory type maintenance for conventional reprocessing technology would be much more expensive than that for successful reprocessing, and government funding was discontinued. However, the program was continued as collaborative development with Japan, and some provisions of the concept were apparently incorporated in the very expensive, French-designed reprocessing plant at Rokkasho Mura.
The DOE cancelled collaborative development with Japan and shut down the Fast Flux Test Facility at Hanford in order to support a demonstration by Argonne National Laboratory of another pyrometallurgical concept - electrorefining - for reprocessing of used nuclear fuel. The electrorefining process had been developed by Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory for recovery of very pure plutonium from scrap generated during fabrication of plutonium weapons parts.
In 1991 I was assigned by DOE’s Office of Nuclear Energy to evaluate this process for a planned demonstration, and identified major concerns about operability, maintainability, safeguardability, and containment of radioactivity - major problems with commercial reprocessing. Of greatest concern were great difficulties for material balance measurements and high plutonium losses. These findings led to a conclusion that the safeguards challenge would be difficult and the process as planned would be neither proliferation-resistant nor viable for commercial nuclear fuel recycle. Concerns about the planned demonstration were reviewed with DOE and DOE laboratory management and technical staff, ANL/DOE Peer Review Groups and many others, and there was no significant disagreement with my findings.
The DOE Strategic Plan for a Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) states "For the past 30 years the United States has conducted research to develop advanced methods of reprocessing spent commercial nuclear fuel that might make reprocessing easier to safeguard and more proliferation-resistant." This statement is misleading and could lead to further misdirection and wasteful expenditures.
Several U.S. nuclear power plant operators are supporting reprocessing with French technology that incorporates experience but lacks important features of DuPont technology.
A BETTER APPROACH TO RESOLVE AMERICA’S ENERGY CHALLENGES
A better approach to resolve America’s long neglected energy challenges should include:
1. The U.S. Energy and Nuclear Technology Board that would have ex_officio members and those appointed by you and future Presidents with the advice and consent of The Senate that would meet periodically to recommend long_term energy and nuclear technology plans, policies, and strategies for America
2. Competent corporate instead of government management of energy and nuclear technology
3. Full and efficient use of nuclear materials instead of their disposal
4. Full and accurate information to Americans about nuclear technology and limitations, challenges and/or non_viability of alternative energy sources
5. Revitalization of President Eisenhower's vision of Atoms for Peace, with cooperation among nations for full use of well_safeguarded, well_managed, and well_conceived nuclear technology for peaceful purposes
6. Partnership_type actions between workers and managers to resolve concerns about nuclear safety and nuclear materials safeguards, and between regulators and those regulated to ensure the best safety, productivity, and cost_effectiveness of nuclear power plants and other licensed nuclear facilities.
7. A "Partnership for America" to develop and implement these ideas to resolve long_neglected energy and nuclear technology challenges and avoid adverse consequences inherent in government management of complex technology.
SOME FINAL THOUGHTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: ENERGY IMPERATIVES
1. Nuclear programs managed by DuPont for the Manhattan Project and Atomic Energy Commission were among the greatest technological achievements of all time. If DuPont concepts had been used for reprocessing and recycle of nuclear materials in used nuclear power plant fuels and disposal of nuclear wastes, many formidable problems and wasteful expenditures would have been avoided.
You, with support from The Congress, and the nuclear power industry should ask DuPont to manage programs for reprocessing and recycle of nuclear materials in used nuclear fuel and disposal of nuclear wastes. Funds for this should be provided by the nuclear waste fund, as appropriate. Leaders of State Governments should be asked to appoint technical/political committees to review DuPont concepts and studies for waste disposal, as Governor John West of South Carolina did for DuPont studies for disposal in bedrock.
2. At a time of need for a major transition, i.e., the need to end our dangerous addiction to imported oil, good government leadership and direction is essential. This leadership and direction should be based on lessons learned from experiences and good understanding of energy fundamentals.
3. Nations that have reduced dependence on imported oil have done so through higher taxes.
4. The need for electric-powered, high speed rail for both inter and intra-regional travel was recognized at the beginning of America’s energy crisis. This need is greater today.
5. Use of fossil and other life-based materials for energy produces atmospheric pollution and greenhouse gases. These materials are needed for transportation in autos and aircraft, household heating and many other important uses. Their use to generate electricity should be phased out.
6. Careful attention should be given to energy fundamentals to avoid subsidies for energy alternatives that will become obsolete when subsidies are removed, and to eliminate funding for non-viable energy systems . The section of "Energy Fundamentals" in this letter should be further refined by The U.S. Energy and Nuclear Technology Board and information provided to all Americans.
Mr. President, the transition from a failure-based to a success-based approach for resolution of America’s long-neglected energy issues will be very difficult. I would be pleased to meet and work with you and other leaders of America to help further refine and implement this better approach that is needed. A copy of my biographical sketch is enclosed.
Best wishes!
Sincerely
Clinton Bastin
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH FOR CLINTON BASTIN FROM 2007 EDITION OF WHO’S WHO IN AMERICA, AS MODIFIED FOR 2008 EDITION
BASTIN, CLINTON, retired chemical engineer, retired federal executive for national nuclear programs and initiatives, life mission to resolve US energy challenges; b. Lancaster, Ky., June 4, 1927; s. Clinton Bowen and Adelaide Klingman Bastin; m. Barbara Spencer Bastin; children: Clinton Bowen III, Nancy Bastin Perry, Anna Bastin McKee, Herbert Spencer. B of Chem. Engring., Ga. Inst. of Tech., 1950; reprocessing and nuclear waste summer seminar for chem. engring. faculty, Amer. Inst. Engring. Edu., Hanford, WA, 1958. Fire protection engr. Southeastern Underwriters Assn., Atlanta, 1950––55; USAEC mgr. heavy water prodn. and distb (first US Atoms for Peace), quality assurance for tritium wpns. components, plutonium_238 prodn and proc.(nuclear power for space), used nuc power fuel disp., Sav Riv Plant, Aiken, SC, 1955––62; mgr. nuc. fuel reprocessing, nuclear waste, related programs and tritium prodn, proc and use in weapons, mem. AEC steering com. gas centrifuge devel., SRP, 1962––72, leader to resolve fuel reprocessing problems Washington, 1972––74; chief light water fuel reprocessing br. US ERDA, Washington, 1975––76, lead tech. cons. Internat. Atomic Energy Agency study of regional fuel reprocessing, 1976; tech. leader, US nonproliferation initiative with India, US NSC Task Force, US Dept. State, Washington, 1977––79; mgr. fuel reprocessing devel., USDOE, 1980__81; coord. with Japan for nuc. fuel cycle devel., 1982––93; pres. DOE hdqs. employees union Nat. Treasury Employees Union, Washington, 1983––96; cons. on nuc. proliferation threats US Nat. Security Agys., Aiken, SC and Washington, 1966__96; ret., 1997; V.P. World Coun. of Nuc. Workers, Paris, 2000––; spkr. in field; cons. in field. Author: (worldwide nuc. programs) US Nuclear Technology: Need for a New Approach, 1996, US Nuclear Technology: Need For New Vision, 1999. Pres. Kiwanis Club of Northlake Golden K, Decatur, Ga., 2004––. Chemistry Instructor (PFC) 1945__46, Marine Corps Institute, Washington, DC. Recipient "Thanks for Wonderful Partnership," Energy Sec. Hazel O'Leary, 1997, Distinguished Career Svc. award, Recognition as US authority on Nuc. Fuel Reprocessing, 1997, letter from Ga Tech Pres. G. Wayne Clough that work on energy is important to future of America, 2004. Mem.: Am. Nuc. Soc. (chair, Ga. sect. 2005––07). Achievements include: (1) selected centrifugal contactors for demonstration which resulted in major reprocessing improvement, 1966, (2) AEC accepted recom. for reproc. based on success instead of failure, 1974, which would have resolved concerns, 1978); (3) Chmn of India AEC accepted recom. that prov. basis for continued nuclear cooperation with US, 1978; (4) Ministry for Atomic Energy of Russia and Russian Nuclear Workers Union adopted ideas for partnerships for improved safety of nuclear facilities and safeguards of nuclear materials (1997); (5), provided info. on (3) to Pres. Bill Clinton and India’s Ambassador to US that he sent to his govt that provided a basis for nuclear cooperation between India and US (1998); Avocations: walking, gardening, writing, teaching nuclear energy at Emory Univ. Lifelong Learning Center. Home: 987 Viscount Ct Avondale Estates GA 30002 Office Phone: 404_297_2005. Personal E_mail: clintonbastin@bellsouth.net.
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